Benkler makes a compelling argument for the loosening of intellectual property rights and by extension exclusive rights as a whole with the potential change it would have in the poorest countries in terms of medicines. The current struggle to make drugs for HIV/AIDS in Africa is certainly an appealing ethical argument, but he does a disservice to his argument when he conflates the potential good of nonproprietary free and open source work for software and how it could be applied to this field. Benkler states:
”We have seen the potential of free and open sources software and open-access publications to replace and redress some of the failures of proprietary software and scientific publication, respectively. These case suggest that the basic choice between a system that depends on exclusive rights and business models that use exclusion to appropriate research outputs and a system that weaves together various actors – public and private, organized and individual – in a nonproprietary social network of innovation, has important implications for the direction of innovation and for access to [foods and medicines].” [238]
Benkler is correct in implying that a sharing amongst medical information could certainly have the potential to help the industry as a whole, but is wrong to imply that the current system of medical research can be considered even close to that of market software. The producers of alternatives to market software have already been explained to be the “Joe Einsteins” of the world, but as Benkler admits these Joes, probably work a day job and do their work in open source world in their free time. These Joes, also most likely face very little cost to manufacture these goods for society, since there is no reason to believe that it costs many of these people more than their time. That is not to say that there is absolutely no cost, but that many already absorbed these costs for other reasons (e.g. everyone needs a computer for work, and once Joe has one, he needs little worry about the cost of creating and sharing his time programming). However, the development of medicine requires quite a different model. We are talking about a much higher level of cost to perform this intellectual inquiry and exploration, and there is very little reason to believe that as many people can do stem cell research in their free time as the people that can program for open source.
This discussion speaks to a larger point, Benkler has a made a compelling argument about why loosening exclusive rights in general would be immediately effective and efficient in the global economy, but does he value the idea behind monetary incentives at all? I’m personally not sure. I agree with him that people and groups as a whole can work for non-market reasons, and can even have a large enough effect that they should not be ignored in our governmental policies. I am confused on how far he believes we should do away with exclusivity on rights of those that are derived from information market and can be replicated with no cost. On one side I agree with him that the fact that we have more than 4 different types of expensive medicine for male impotence is disgusting considering the diseases and illnesses that the world faces as a whole. However, I really would like to know where he draws the line. Our world might not be worse without mega budget blockbuster films, but how do we pay for research in Benkler’s ideal world?
1. 66% of Software Industry from Non-IP Related Services
Benkler claims that “two-thirds of revenues derived from software in the United States are from services and do not depend on proprietary exclusion” (320-321). Chapter 2 was the originating source for these comments and the reference data (8 and footnote 8). The NAICS does not explicitly or implicitly define category 5415 (and subcodes) as “non-IP based” (317/table 9.1; for NAICS definitions, see http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF541.HTM#N5415). Consider that many enterprise computer services are only offered under an existing license agreement (to IP-controlled software). For example, a customer can buy marketing software services from a particular vendor only if it has already bought or is entering into an agreement to buy the proprietary marketing software that the vendor also sells. From this example (which is not hypothetical), it seems that certain services are provided only under the umbrella of exclusionary access to software products; and given that the NAICS categories do not (at least clearly) differentiate IP versus non-IP related services in the Census, then Benkler must be using unreferenced data (or definitions) or may be opportunistically interpreting the data to support his argument. If we agree that services are an important part of our economy (which is demonstrated by the Economic Census) and that the numbers show that computer services are tied to Intellectual Property rights, then perhaps the economic impacts of intellectual property are less ambiguous than Benkler suggests (318).
2. Patents Kill.
The darker side of patents (and intellectual property in general) is that when they relate to human life, especially to health and food, access to certain information that is controlled by them is a matter of life and death. Benkler confronts us with the moral issue of making medicines available to the developed world and attempts to connect us to the problem of drug scarcity by noting that our (i.e. those of us in wealthy countries) unwillingness to pay high rents for drugs impedes the most immediate path for developing countries to drugs (346). I don’t think we need to even look beyond our own boarders to find the moral issue of health-related patents. Michael Crichton’s op-ed piece in the NY Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html), “Patenting Life,” gives us reasons “closer to home” to reconsider the business practices related to drug and gene patents: “YOU, or someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should have never been granted in the first place.” A test for breast cancer relies on a particular gene. Even though that gene is a part of every single human being, the United States Patent Office has given exclusive right to one company to use it. In a parallel (but less discursive) argument, Crichton argues that “genes” are not inventions (which patents were meant to protect) but a feature of life and demonstrates the absurdity of such patents with several examples that could affect our own “wealthy” lives. Given that “the United States and Europe are creating a global innovation system that relies on patents” (345), we need to convince ourselves (i.e., those of us in the United States and Europe) that we stand to benefit from patent reform, just as Michael Crichton so clearly (and perhaps more concisely) demonstrates.
3. Extronet?
In chapter 10, Benkler quotes (among others) two studies related to the social effects of the Internet on individuals: “Internet Paradox” (360; footnote 2) and “Internet Paradox Revisited” (363; footnote 11). It is interesting to note that the authors of the follow up study concluded that “…the Internet may be more beneficial to individuals to the extent they can leverage opportunities to enhance their everyday lives. Those who are already effective in using social and informational resources in the world are likely well positioned to take advantage of a powerful new technology like the Internet.” (Kraut 2002: 10). Doesn’t this suggest that those who are more inclined to social interaction leverage the Internet in more positive ways than those who are not? In addition the authors found that “heavier Internet use also was associated with greater stress, less local knowledge, and lower desire to stay in the local area.” This second finding is interesting because it may suggest that some types of strong ties (i.e. those ties depending on our immediate living location) might be eroded through the use of the Internet. Benkler would probably counter this with his example of the Toronto suburb “Netville” (363-364). The authors of “Internet Paradox Revisited” do not attempt to identify the causal factors related to their conclusion, which would be useful to compare with Benkler and determine their compatibility.
Benkler raises an important point regarding the possibility of universities increasing their roles in non-market/sub-prime market production. Looking at table 9.2 (340), we can see how licensing and royalties make up only about 1-2% of Stanford’s total revenues. If individuals were asked to give 1-2% of their personal incomes to fight famine and disease in developing nations ($10 out of every $1000), this would be no substantial burden for them. Perhaps we already give this much to such causes. What might have been more helpful for this discussion, however, is if Benkler included the net revenues of the universities in table 9.2. Although we might expect universities to focus on helping the global community, I do not think any of us would want these universities to sacrifice their well-being to achieve this goal. Perhaps we can assume that Stanford giving away 2% of its revenues would not throw the university into the red.
Universities are ideal places to explore non-market solutions because, much more so than in industry, their employees (professors) push the boundaries of human knowledge for the sake of knowledge and personal prestige. Their contributions increase their chances of receiving job security with tenure, therefore university culture equally encourages those motivated by ego and and those by greenbacks. Although one might imagine a professor wishing to collect patents for her tenure review, the professor’s well-being does not necessarily rely upon exploiting the patent to pay the rent. Benkler mentions the arrangement formed between Doctors with Borders, Yale University, and Bristol-Myers-Squibb to provide a $1600/year AIDS medication for $55/year in South Africa (347). In this agreement, Benkler sees a solution for providing affordable medications for those who need them:
“An Indian or American generics manufacturer could produce patented drugs that relied on university patents and were licensed under this kind of an equitable-access license, as long as it distributed its products solely in poor countries” (349).
Sweet, I love it. Benkler does draw attention to the limitations of this solution on the next page, mentioning how university research does not hold all medicinal patents nor are patents the biggest problem facing the distribution of medicine (350). However, help where help is needed should never be underestimated.
But there was something missing from this chapter. Mainly, Benkler’s networked solution for providing affordable medications for those who need them in this country. Perhaps he addresses America’s healthcare crisis in later chapters, but I fear that he does not. AIDS is not a pandemic here as it is in South Africa and Lesotho, but, as Benkler mentions earlier in the chapter, neither is it a ghost in the United States. Should we assume that the AIDS population who cannot afford $1600/year for life-prolonging medication is negligible, or small enough that Benkler should not suggest a method of leveraging university patents to help them? Perhaps if we developed a sustainable and acceptable model for developing and distributing medicine in this county, we would have a real idea of how to solve pandemics in other countries.
The focus of chapter ten seems to revolve around this question–
“is it, on balance, a good thing that we have multiple, overlapping, limited emotional liability relationships or does it undermine our socially embedded being?”
This, however, seems a little too general for what the chapter is really trying to question. I think that the real question is whether quantity or quality of social interaction better?
The internet is a facilitator–it is an enabler. It makes it easier for more people to be in touch with others in a more convenient and efficient way. In a society that is so dependent on instant gratification and on the efficient use of time, the internet has become the best way to be both in touch and on time.
But the ability to be in touch does not necessarily mean that the social interactions are as fulfilling as they once used to be.
Benkler argues that because we use “strong filtering on our internet-based social connections” and because we use these new lines of communication to “thicken and strengthen preexisting relationships” that we choose the people with who we continue to have meaningful social interactions. Benkler is essentially arguing that the quantity of communication does not affect the quality of interaction with those that matter. But I do not agree.
His two mechanisms of support are 1) “parsimony with which people use instant messaging” and 2) people’s tendency to choose social networks that are personally relevant. I agree that people tend to cluster around things they hold to be personally fulfilling, but I do not agree that people are as parsimonious with their texting/ IM habits. IM and texting has quickly become one of the most popular ways to communicate and I believe that it will continue to dominate how people talk to one another and share information. I don’t think that people will continue to be as choosey about who they text or IM and it will no longer be a good indicator of who or which people are important in a person’s social life.
I think we can all agree that quality of communication is better than quantity, especially with those that matter. Regardless of technology, the things that maintain these close relationships will always be time and energy. Therefore, our social circles will continue to grow, but the inner rings will have to remain tightly knit in order for us to maintain the satisfaction we get out of those close relationships. Technology can enable us to do so, can facilitate the process, but the quality of the interaction is fundamentally up to our own efforts.
In Chapter 9, Benkler states a heavy fear for developing countries who are aiming to achieve some level of self-sufficiency as a society: “…the industrialization of agriculture is seen as creating dependencies in the periphery on the industrial-scientific core of the global economy”(334). This concern led me to further question whether providing the information and technology necessary to more successfully produce food contributed to this end. These would possibly in the short-run alleviate some starvation by simply providing food and some work, and it is certainly not the case that people should continue to starve, but that as a global community we should strive for a long-term solution, “achieving food security” seems a step short of that goal.
The questions that come to mind are: Will there really be the necessary education and political and cultural atmosphere for these developing countries to utilize and contribute to “the commons-based strategies?” It seems that there is not much diversity in the political framework required to allow such strategies to thrive. In a way, Benkler is indirectly making the claim that in order for developing countries to reap the full benefits of information and technology, they must adopt the political framework that even the US is slow to accept. Of course, this is worry some in many ways, and only brings to light the more complex issues that stand in the way of a higher quality of life for all.
In reading Benkler’s suggestions for ways to incorporate networked production into medicine, agriculture, and other fields in which patents are a significant factor in intellectual property, it seems that patents serve two important social purposes:
1) providing monopoly rights from the government
2) providing an important cultural measure of innovation
This second function is very important, but there is no way to measure it separately in our present patent scheme. To get the benefit of social ratification of an invention for measurement purposes, a monopoly grant is required. Even Benkler, who knows better, measures the success of technology transfer departments at universities by looking at their number of patents (348), because presently there isn’t any other alternative.
Benkler attempts to introduce statistics based on “lives saved [and] quality-of-life measures improved.” Of course this introduces many confounds, as it is hard to measure the effect of an innovation separate from its distribution, to say nothing of its effect separate from local politics, climatic conditions, interaction with other innovations, etc. So, how do we measure the amount of innovation, separate from its effects?
Benkler acknowledges that it will be difficult to make any changes to international patent law, and that working in licensing subsystems based on patent pools is probably the most practical approach. He doesn’t mention, though, a more global approach to discriminating between patent rights and innovation itself.
Inventors might participate because it would provide an important form of social vetting. Employees would prefer to work for employers who have more of these notices, venture capitalists would fund companies with the notices even if the patent itself would not likely be defensible, and technology transfer offices could measure their success more objectively.
In some ways, this would be like the citation-prestige system for academic papers (i.e., someone else could publish another paper on an identical topic (register a similar innovation), but would not receive the same prestige for doing so). It also could be seen as a variation on Mark Lemley’s gold-plated patent scheme at the other limit (instead of requiring more examination up-front for more patent protection, this would require less examination for less (or no) patent protection).
Of course, trade secrets could still be kept secret, but for innovations that the innovator would like to make publicly known without needing patent protection this might work. Decoupling rights from notice would make innovation policy saner.
Chapter 10
I find it intriguing that online communications appear to cut into television time more than social time. It occurs to me that relationships with television characters replaced relationships with actual people, so that we used to gossip about celebrities instead of gossiping about acquaintances, for example. People would rather have a relationship with people they know in a customizable way. However, this has not before been possible.
Use of the internet is reclaiming this social time back from commercialization. In a way, Facebook, YouTube, email, IM, etc. are folk media, allowing us to create communications personalized to individuals and communities, instead of one-size-fits-all communications broadcast from mass media. Also, by lowering the transaction costs of maintaining weak ties, the social use of the internet has created great leverage for folk media: instead of writing a ballad about a local hero only to be heard in your village, you can a video of yourself singing it to your friends by email.
Since email, IM, etc. are an extension of face-to-face or phone communications, it should not be shocking that they do not replace them, but cut into the time spent using a technology that does not meet our social needs as well: television.
The idea argued against in chapter 10 – that the internet would end up isolating those who use it from “real life” (an episode of some old sci-fi show of my youth comes to mind, either Seaquest or Sliders) seems to just be the latest iteration of the reaction to the “electric sublime” felt by the champions of the new technology.
This panic about the demons of the isolating technology seems not based on actual problems recorded but concerns about changing from the “good old days” that the technology represents. For example, the misleading study citing the internet as evil (360 -361) only found internet use affecting the amount of time spent watching TV or shopping at a physical store(361). They also seemed to rely on self-reported data, meaning that even if less time was spent empirically with the family, then at least it didn’t appear to be that way to the test subjects.
However, both the negative and positive affects need to be taken in context. Were those who reported being isolated and used the internet a lot isolated before they used the internet? Even the Japanese teenager’s use of cell phone testing needs to be looked at (367). I just spent 5 months in Japan prior to coming to school and had to get a cell phone. I used it for testing more than I had before not because my American phone couldn’t, or because I had never used such asynchronous technology before but because it was cheaper. It cost tens times as much to talk on the phone for a minute than to send an epic e-mail. Furthermore, there’s a big culture of a train commute (my host brother spent 4 hours on the train most days) with not much room and no talking in Japan. Having a small way to kill time while trapped in a crowded, quiet space is better than a bigger but harder to transport alternative. Perhaps Japan should be looked at also in terms of how much things cost in their society and how that would effect each use as argued for the phone(371).
Though the naysayers against the internet are not completely right, they are also not completely wrong. The new communications that appear are held to the old standards. They do help “thicken” the already preexisting relationships and just add a new way to interact with someone you know (376), but face to face interaction is valued more than a phone call which is valued more than an e-mail, as can be seen in the judging of how important relationships are and how un-isolating the internet is in many studies presented in this chapter(361, 363-364, 367-368, 368, 375-377). Taking the time to seek out someone physically or to write a letter shows a greater time commitment which in turn makes the recipient feel like they are more important to the person taking this action. Just ask anyone who’s been the victim of a text message breakup.
On page 318, Benkler argues that the reason intellectual property policy is harmful to developing countries is that they have little money to pay the producers of proprietary information, and so producers in the information industry have little incentive to produce information that is useful to or geared to developing countries’ needs. For example, he notes, the pharmaceutical industry doesn’t invest in drugs for diseases that primarily affect developing countries.
However, the problem of emphasis on the interests and needs of developed countries persists in the networked, peer-produced information economy. In particular, the Babel objection again rears its ugly head — with all the information out there, how can people and industries in developing countries find the information that they need? Benkler’s catch-all answer to this problem is the use of peer-produced filters, but filters are primarily created and produced by users of the networked information economy who are from developed countries. In other words, it’s rare for anyone to Digg a guide to the best health care practices for inhabitants of developing countries. Popular information filters often turn up information on disorders like ADD but not much on malaria or basic AIDS/HIV protection information. And surely none of the tech geeks on Slashdot is going to care much about techniques for farming during droughts.
Benkler might argue that this too is caused by the fact that information operates within a proprietary framework, so that the only new medical information being produced is that which serves rich interests (hence the emphasis on ADD, Restless Leg Syndrome, and other popular subjects of proprietary pharmaceutical research), but the fact is that there is still a lot of information available on the Internet that addresses the needs of developing countries, yet doesn’t make it through the peer-produced information filter because those who dominate the filters consider it irrelevant to their lives or such common knowledge as to render it unnoteworthy (the idea that condoms can help prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, for example, is considered common knowledge in the United States, but still needs to be spread through countries like India and South Africa).
Naturally, another possible response by Benkler is to highlight the success of smaller organizations that focus on the problems of developing countries, but this is no different from what already exists in the present. These organizations are primarily voluntarily nonmarket, and applying their model to the networked information economy at large is unlikely to produce more information relevant to developing countries or to make such information more accessible, precisely because of the fact that issues relevant to the rich still have the most research and accessibility impetus behind them, both on the production side (current researchers have more experience and interest in such issues) and on the reception side (most people who can access the networked information economy won’t care about issues relevant only to developing countries). Therefore, applying the model that has worked in limited contexts to a larger scale is unlikely to create more benefits than already exist now in the current system.
As for possible alternatives, I currently think that people are unlikely to invest in solving the problems of developing countries unless there are some financial incentives, most likely via public funds. I don’t have a clear alternative, but I do think that making the work that serves the rich just as unprofitable as the work that serves the poor is unlikely to benefit anyone.
Benkler begins Chapter 9 by overviewing some theories of justice, many of them aimed at alleviating the disadvantages people may suffer due to “luck.” Because one’s wealth status may, in certain circumstances and to some degree, be attributed to luck, it is therefore “just” to make life needs more affordable so that the less fortunate do not suffer. “To the extent that any of the basic utilities required to participate in an information economy at all are available without sensitivity to price–that is, free to anyone–they are made available in a form that is substantially insulated from the happenstance of initial wealth endowments,” argues Benkler on page 307. This phrase jumped out at me because, as far as I’m aware, the basic utilities — that is, computers and internet access — still cost a considerable amount of money.
Computers are prohibitively expensive for many people, which limits their ability to participate in the networked information economy. The simplest answer is to head to the library, but speaking in a global context (which this chapter does), that is not an available option for the millions who do not live within travelling distance of one. Benkler Even given a library, to participate in the NIE one must still have the expertise necessary to work the computer in such a way as would allow interaction with those whom you need to interact with. Freer information, as Benkler posits, certainly helps the education process by allowing teaching materials to be purchased more cheaply. But even with free materials, in order to be educated to work a computer, one must pay the opportunity cost of spending time in a classroom, which takes time away from money-gaining activities. This, again, places a rich-poor divide in the market. Just as in the old market, in the NIE, the advantaged are more able to participate in the economy than the disadvantaged.
Benkler acknowledges these criticisms on page 326, admitting “low educational completion in the poorer areas of the world are largely a result of … lack of infrastructure. … The opportunity cost of children’s labor is probably the largest factor.” However, hope is not lost for the NIE. Benkler may or may not have explicitly drawn the connection, but if commons-based advances in agricultural research are successful enough in increasing crop yields, and charitable activities are successful in making the finished products (seeds, etc) available to poorer countries, this would alleviate the opportunity cost of labor (at least, in terms of marginal utility, if not money) in agricultural economies, allowing children to go to school. Also, the greater income provided to these agricultural economies would allow them to develop their infrastructure, making schools and libraries more accessible and allowing the underprivilaged to more easily participate in the NIE.
9 responses so far ↓
1
gnewman
// Oct 30, 2007 at 2:39 am
Benkler makes a compelling argument for the loosening of intellectual property rights and by extension exclusive rights as a whole with the potential change it would have in the poorest countries in terms of medicines. The current struggle to make drugs for HIV/AIDS in Africa is certainly an appealing ethical argument, but he does a disservice to his argument when he conflates the potential good of nonproprietary free and open source work for software and how it could be applied to this field. Benkler states:
”We have seen the potential of free and open sources software and open-access publications to replace and redress some of the failures of proprietary software and scientific publication, respectively. These case suggest that the basic choice between a system that depends on exclusive rights and business models that use exclusion to appropriate research outputs and a system that weaves together various actors – public and private, organized and individual – in a nonproprietary social network of innovation, has important implications for the direction of innovation and for access to [foods and medicines].” [238]
Benkler is correct in implying that a sharing amongst medical information could certainly have the potential to help the industry as a whole, but is wrong to imply that the current system of medical research can be considered even close to that of market software. The producers of alternatives to market software have already been explained to be the “Joe Einsteins” of the world, but as Benkler admits these Joes, probably work a day job and do their work in open source world in their free time. These Joes, also most likely face very little cost to manufacture these goods for society, since there is no reason to believe that it costs many of these people more than their time. That is not to say that there is absolutely no cost, but that many already absorbed these costs for other reasons (e.g. everyone needs a computer for work, and once Joe has one, he needs little worry about the cost of creating and sharing his time programming). However, the development of medicine requires quite a different model. We are talking about a much higher level of cost to perform this intellectual inquiry and exploration, and there is very little reason to believe that as many people can do stem cell research in their free time as the people that can program for open source.
This discussion speaks to a larger point, Benkler has a made a compelling argument about why loosening exclusive rights in general would be immediately effective and efficient in the global economy, but does he value the idea behind monetary incentives at all? I’m personally not sure. I agree with him that people and groups as a whole can work for non-market reasons, and can even have a large enough effect that they should not be ignored in our governmental policies. I am confused on how far he believes we should do away with exclusivity on rights of those that are derived from information market and can be replicated with no cost. On one side I agree with him that the fact that we have more than 4 different types of expensive medicine for male impotence is disgusting considering the diseases and illnesses that the world faces as a whole. However, I really would like to know where he draws the line. Our world might not be worse without mega budget blockbuster films, but how do we pay for research in Benkler’s ideal world?
2
johnmagdaleno
// Oct 30, 2007 at 11:25 am
1. 66% of Software Industry from Non-IP Related Services
Benkler claims that “two-thirds of revenues derived from software in the United States are from services and do not depend on proprietary exclusion” (320-321). Chapter 2 was the originating source for these comments and the reference data (8 and footnote 8). The NAICS does not explicitly or implicitly define category 5415 (and subcodes) as “non-IP based” (317/table 9.1; for NAICS definitions, see http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF541.HTM#N5415). Consider that many enterprise computer services are only offered under an existing license agreement (to IP-controlled software). For example, a customer can buy marketing software services from a particular vendor only if it has already bought or is entering into an agreement to buy the proprietary marketing software that the vendor also sells. From this example (which is not hypothetical), it seems that certain services are provided only under the umbrella of exclusionary access to software products; and given that the NAICS categories do not (at least clearly) differentiate IP versus non-IP related services in the Census, then Benkler must be using unreferenced data (or definitions) or may be opportunistically interpreting the data to support his argument. If we agree that services are an important part of our economy (which is demonstrated by the Economic Census) and that the numbers show that computer services are tied to Intellectual Property rights, then perhaps the economic impacts of intellectual property are less ambiguous than Benkler suggests (318).
2. Patents Kill.
The darker side of patents (and intellectual property in general) is that when they relate to human life, especially to health and food, access to certain information that is controlled by them is a matter of life and death. Benkler confronts us with the moral issue of making medicines available to the developed world and attempts to connect us to the problem of drug scarcity by noting that our (i.e. those of us in wealthy countries) unwillingness to pay high rents for drugs impedes the most immediate path for developing countries to drugs (346). I don’t think we need to even look beyond our own boarders to find the moral issue of health-related patents. Michael Crichton’s op-ed piece in the NY Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html), “Patenting Life,” gives us reasons “closer to home” to reconsider the business practices related to drug and gene patents: “YOU, or someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should have never been granted in the first place.” A test for breast cancer relies on a particular gene. Even though that gene is a part of every single human being, the United States Patent Office has given exclusive right to one company to use it. In a parallel (but less discursive) argument, Crichton argues that “genes” are not inventions (which patents were meant to protect) but a feature of life and demonstrates the absurdity of such patents with several examples that could affect our own “wealthy” lives. Given that “the United States and Europe are creating a global innovation system that relies on patents” (345), we need to convince ourselves (i.e., those of us in the United States and Europe) that we stand to benefit from patent reform, just as Michael Crichton so clearly (and perhaps more concisely) demonstrates.
3. Extronet?
In chapter 10, Benkler quotes (among others) two studies related to the social effects of the Internet on individuals: “Internet Paradox” (360; footnote 2) and “Internet Paradox Revisited” (363; footnote 11). It is interesting to note that the authors of the follow up study concluded that “…the Internet may be more beneficial to individuals to the extent they can leverage opportunities to enhance their everyday lives. Those who are already effective in using social and informational resources in the world are likely well positioned to take advantage of a powerful new technology like the Internet.” (Kraut 2002: 10). Doesn’t this suggest that those who are more inclined to social interaction leverage the Internet in more positive ways than those who are not? In addition the authors found that “heavier Internet use also was associated with greater stress, less local knowledge, and lower desire to stay in the local area.” This second finding is interesting because it may suggest that some types of strong ties (i.e. those ties depending on our immediate living location) might be eroded through the use of the Internet. Benkler would probably counter this with his example of the Toronto suburb “Netville” (363-364). The authors of “Internet Paradox Revisited” do not attempt to identify the causal factors related to their conclusion, which would be useful to compare with Benkler and determine their compatibility.
3
jarobb3
// Oct 30, 2007 at 11:48 am
Benkler raises an important point regarding the possibility of universities increasing their roles in non-market/sub-prime market production. Looking at table 9.2 (340), we can see how licensing and royalties make up only about 1-2% of Stanford’s total revenues. If individuals were asked to give 1-2% of their personal incomes to fight famine and disease in developing nations ($10 out of every $1000), this would be no substantial burden for them. Perhaps we already give this much to such causes. What might have been more helpful for this discussion, however, is if Benkler included the net revenues of the universities in table 9.2. Although we might expect universities to focus on helping the global community, I do not think any of us would want these universities to sacrifice their well-being to achieve this goal. Perhaps we can assume that Stanford giving away 2% of its revenues would not throw the university into the red.
Universities are ideal places to explore non-market solutions because, much more so than in industry, their employees (professors) push the boundaries of human knowledge for the sake of knowledge and personal prestige. Their contributions increase their chances of receiving job security with tenure, therefore university culture equally encourages those motivated by ego and and those by greenbacks. Although one might imagine a professor wishing to collect patents for her tenure review, the professor’s well-being does not necessarily rely upon exploiting the patent to pay the rent. Benkler mentions the arrangement formed between Doctors with Borders, Yale University, and Bristol-Myers-Squibb to provide a $1600/year AIDS medication for $55/year in South Africa (347). In this agreement, Benkler sees a solution for providing affordable medications for those who need them:
“An Indian or American generics manufacturer could produce patented drugs that relied on university patents and were licensed under this kind of an equitable-access license, as long as it distributed its products solely in poor countries” (349).
Sweet, I love it. Benkler does draw attention to the limitations of this solution on the next page, mentioning how university research does not hold all medicinal patents nor are patents the biggest problem facing the distribution of medicine (350). However, help where help is needed should never be underestimated.
But there was something missing from this chapter. Mainly, Benkler’s networked solution for providing affordable medications for those who need them in this country. Perhaps he addresses America’s healthcare crisis in later chapters, but I fear that he does not. AIDS is not a pandemic here as it is in South Africa and Lesotho, but, as Benkler mentions earlier in the chapter, neither is it a ghost in the United States. Should we assume that the AIDS population who cannot afford $1600/year for life-prolonging medication is negligible, or small enough that Benkler should not suggest a method of leveraging university patents to help them? Perhaps if we developed a sustainable and acceptable model for developing and distributing medicine in this county, we would have a real idea of how to solve pandemics in other countries.
4
lvmesa
// Oct 30, 2007 at 1:57 pm
The focus of chapter ten seems to revolve around this question–
“is it, on balance, a good thing that we have multiple, overlapping, limited emotional liability relationships or does it undermine our socially embedded being?”
This, however, seems a little too general for what the chapter is really trying to question. I think that the real question is whether quantity or quality of social interaction better?
The internet is a facilitator–it is an enabler. It makes it easier for more people to be in touch with others in a more convenient and efficient way. In a society that is so dependent on instant gratification and on the efficient use of time, the internet has become the best way to be both in touch and on time.
But the ability to be in touch does not necessarily mean that the social interactions are as fulfilling as they once used to be.
Benkler argues that because we use “strong filtering on our internet-based social connections” and because we use these new lines of communication to “thicken and strengthen preexisting relationships” that we choose the people with who we continue to have meaningful social interactions. Benkler is essentially arguing that the quantity of communication does not affect the quality of interaction with those that matter. But I do not agree.
His two mechanisms of support are 1) “parsimony with which people use instant messaging” and 2) people’s tendency to choose social networks that are personally relevant. I agree that people tend to cluster around things they hold to be personally fulfilling, but I do not agree that people are as parsimonious with their texting/ IM habits. IM and texting has quickly become one of the most popular ways to communicate and I believe that it will continue to dominate how people talk to one another and share information. I don’t think that people will continue to be as choosey about who they text or IM and it will no longer be a good indicator of who or which people are important in a person’s social life.
I think we can all agree that quality of communication is better than quantity, especially with those that matter. Regardless of technology, the things that maintain these close relationships will always be time and energy. Therefore, our social circles will continue to grow, but the inner rings will have to remain tightly knit in order for us to maintain the satisfaction we get out of those close relationships. Technology can enable us to do so, can facilitate the process, but the quality of the interaction is fundamentally up to our own efforts.
5
fwy08
// Oct 30, 2007 at 3:13 pm
In Chapter 9, Benkler states a heavy fear for developing countries who are aiming to achieve some level of self-sufficiency as a society: “…the industrialization of agriculture is seen as creating dependencies in the periphery on the industrial-scientific core of the global economy”(334). This concern led me to further question whether providing the information and technology necessary to more successfully produce food contributed to this end. These would possibly in the short-run alleviate some starvation by simply providing food and some work, and it is certainly not the case that people should continue to starve, but that as a global community we should strive for a long-term solution, “achieving food security” seems a step short of that goal.
The questions that come to mind are: Will there really be the necessary education and political and cultural atmosphere for these developing countries to utilize and contribute to “the commons-based strategies?” It seems that there is not much diversity in the political framework required to allow such strategies to thrive. In a way, Benkler is indirectly making the claim that in order for developing countries to reap the full benefits of information and technology, they must adopt the political framework that even the US is slow to accept. Of course, this is worry some in many ways, and only brings to light the more complex issues that stand in the way of a higher quality of life for all.
6
dulcinea
// Oct 30, 2007 at 5:19 pm
Chapter 9
In reading Benkler’s suggestions for ways to incorporate networked production into medicine, agriculture, and other fields in which patents are a significant factor in intellectual property, it seems that patents serve two important social purposes:
1) providing monopoly rights from the government
2) providing an important cultural measure of innovation
This second function is very important, but there is no way to measure it separately in our present patent scheme. To get the benefit of social ratification of an invention for measurement purposes, a monopoly grant is required. Even Benkler, who knows better, measures the success of technology transfer departments at universities by looking at their number of patents (348), because presently there isn’t any other alternative.
Benkler attempts to introduce statistics based on “lives saved [and] quality-of-life measures improved.” Of course this introduces many confounds, as it is hard to measure the effect of an innovation separate from its distribution, to say nothing of its effect separate from local politics, climatic conditions, interaction with other innovations, etc. So, how do we measure the amount of innovation, separate from its effects?
Benkler acknowledges that it will be difficult to make any changes to international patent law, and that working in licensing subsystems based on patent pools is probably the most practical approach. He doesn’t mention, though, a more global approach to discriminating between patent rights and innovation itself.
Inventors might participate because it would provide an important form of social vetting. Employees would prefer to work for employers who have more of these notices, venture capitalists would fund companies with the notices even if the patent itself would not likely be defensible, and technology transfer offices could measure their success more objectively.
In some ways, this would be like the citation-prestige system for academic papers (i.e., someone else could publish another paper on an identical topic (register a similar innovation), but would not receive the same prestige for doing so). It also could be seen as a variation on Mark Lemley’s gold-plated patent scheme at the other limit (instead of requiring more examination up-front for more patent protection, this would require less examination for less (or no) patent protection).
Of course, trade secrets could still be kept secret, but for innovations that the innovator would like to make publicly known without needing patent protection this might work. Decoupling rights from notice would make innovation policy saner.
Chapter 10
I find it intriguing that online communications appear to cut into television time more than social time. It occurs to me that relationships with television characters replaced relationships with actual people, so that we used to gossip about celebrities instead of gossiping about acquaintances, for example. People would rather have a relationship with people they know in a customizable way. However, this has not before been possible.
Use of the internet is reclaiming this social time back from commercialization. In a way, Facebook, YouTube, email, IM, etc. are folk media, allowing us to create communications personalized to individuals and communities, instead of one-size-fits-all communications broadcast from mass media. Also, by lowering the transaction costs of maintaining weak ties, the social use of the internet has created great leverage for folk media: instead of writing a ballad about a local hero only to be heard in your village, you can a video of yourself singing it to your friends by email.
Since email, IM, etc. are an extension of face-to-face or phone communications, it should not be shocking that they do not replace them, but cut into the time spent using a technology that does not meet our social needs as well: television.
7
dreadpirateroberts
// Oct 30, 2007 at 5:30 pm
The idea argued against in chapter 10 – that the internet would end up isolating those who use it from “real life” (an episode of some old sci-fi show of my youth comes to mind, either Seaquest or Sliders) seems to just be the latest iteration of the reaction to the “electric sublime” felt by the champions of the new technology.
This panic about the demons of the isolating technology seems not based on actual problems recorded but concerns about changing from the “good old days” that the technology represents. For example, the misleading study citing the internet as evil (360 -361) only found internet use affecting the amount of time spent watching TV or shopping at a physical store(361). They also seemed to rely on self-reported data, meaning that even if less time was spent empirically with the family, then at least it didn’t appear to be that way to the test subjects.
However, both the negative and positive affects need to be taken in context. Were those who reported being isolated and used the internet a lot isolated before they used the internet? Even the Japanese teenager’s use of cell phone testing needs to be looked at (367). I just spent 5 months in Japan prior to coming to school and had to get a cell phone. I used it for testing more than I had before not because my American phone couldn’t, or because I had never used such asynchronous technology before but because it was cheaper. It cost tens times as much to talk on the phone for a minute than to send an epic e-mail. Furthermore, there’s a big culture of a train commute (my host brother spent 4 hours on the train most days) with not much room and no talking in Japan. Having a small way to kill time while trapped in a crowded, quiet space is better than a bigger but harder to transport alternative. Perhaps Japan should be looked at also in terms of how much things cost in their society and how that would effect each use as argued for the phone(371).
Though the naysayers against the internet are not completely right, they are also not completely wrong. The new communications that appear are held to the old standards. They do help “thicken” the already preexisting relationships and just add a new way to interact with someone you know (376), but face to face interaction is valued more than a phone call which is valued more than an e-mail, as can be seen in the judging of how important relationships are and how un-isolating the internet is in many studies presented in this chapter(361, 363-364, 367-368, 368, 375-377). Taking the time to seek out someone physically or to write a letter shows a greater time commitment which in turn makes the recipient feel like they are more important to the person taking this action. Just ask anyone who’s been the victim of a text message breakup.
8
clizzin
// Oct 30, 2007 at 5:57 pm
On page 318, Benkler argues that the reason intellectual property policy is harmful to developing countries is that they have little money to pay the producers of proprietary information, and so producers in the information industry have little incentive to produce information that is useful to or geared to developing countries’ needs. For example, he notes, the pharmaceutical industry doesn’t invest in drugs for diseases that primarily affect developing countries.
However, the problem of emphasis on the interests and needs of developed countries persists in the networked, peer-produced information economy. In particular, the Babel objection again rears its ugly head — with all the information out there, how can people and industries in developing countries find the information that they need? Benkler’s catch-all answer to this problem is the use of peer-produced filters, but filters are primarily created and produced by users of the networked information economy who are from developed countries. In other words, it’s rare for anyone to Digg a guide to the best health care practices for inhabitants of developing countries. Popular information filters often turn up information on disorders like ADD but not much on malaria or basic AIDS/HIV protection information. And surely none of the tech geeks on Slashdot is going to care much about techniques for farming during droughts.
Benkler might argue that this too is caused by the fact that information operates within a proprietary framework, so that the only new medical information being produced is that which serves rich interests (hence the emphasis on ADD, Restless Leg Syndrome, and other popular subjects of proprietary pharmaceutical research), but the fact is that there is still a lot of information available on the Internet that addresses the needs of developing countries, yet doesn’t make it through the peer-produced information filter because those who dominate the filters consider it irrelevant to their lives or such common knowledge as to render it unnoteworthy (the idea that condoms can help prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, for example, is considered common knowledge in the United States, but still needs to be spread through countries like India and South Africa).
Naturally, another possible response by Benkler is to highlight the success of smaller organizations that focus on the problems of developing countries, but this is no different from what already exists in the present. These organizations are primarily voluntarily nonmarket, and applying their model to the networked information economy at large is unlikely to produce more information relevant to developing countries or to make such information more accessible, precisely because of the fact that issues relevant to the rich still have the most research and accessibility impetus behind them, both on the production side (current researchers have more experience and interest in such issues) and on the reception side (most people who can access the networked information economy won’t care about issues relevant only to developing countries). Therefore, applying the model that has worked in limited contexts to a larger scale is unlikely to create more benefits than already exist now in the current system.
As for possible alternatives, I currently think that people are unlikely to invest in solving the problems of developing countries unless there are some financial incentives, most likely via public funds. I don’t have a clear alternative, but I do think that making the work that serves the rich just as unprofitable as the work that serves the poor is unlikely to benefit anyone.
9
benkr
// Oct 30, 2007 at 5:59 pm
Benkler begins Chapter 9 by overviewing some theories of justice, many of them aimed at alleviating the disadvantages people may suffer due to “luck.” Because one’s wealth status may, in certain circumstances and to some degree, be attributed to luck, it is therefore “just” to make life needs more affordable so that the less fortunate do not suffer. “To the extent that any of the basic utilities required to participate in an information economy at all are available without sensitivity to price–that is, free to anyone–they are made available in a form that is substantially insulated from the happenstance of initial wealth endowments,” argues Benkler on page 307. This phrase jumped out at me because, as far as I’m aware, the basic utilities — that is, computers and internet access — still cost a considerable amount of money.
Computers are prohibitively expensive for many people, which limits their ability to participate in the networked information economy. The simplest answer is to head to the library, but speaking in a global context (which this chapter does), that is not an available option for the millions who do not live within travelling distance of one. Benkler Even given a library, to participate in the NIE one must still have the expertise necessary to work the computer in such a way as would allow interaction with those whom you need to interact with. Freer information, as Benkler posits, certainly helps the education process by allowing teaching materials to be purchased more cheaply. But even with free materials, in order to be educated to work a computer, one must pay the opportunity cost of spending time in a classroom, which takes time away from money-gaining activities. This, again, places a rich-poor divide in the market. Just as in the old market, in the NIE, the advantaged are more able to participate in the economy than the disadvantaged.
Benkler acknowledges these criticisms on page 326, admitting “low educational completion in the poorer areas of the world are largely a result of … lack of infrastructure. … The opportunity cost of children’s labor is probably the largest factor.” However, hope is not lost for the NIE. Benkler may or may not have explicitly drawn the connection, but if commons-based advances in agricultural research are successful enough in increasing crop yields, and charitable activities are successful in making the finished products (seeds, etc) available to poorer countries, this would alleviate the opportunity cost of labor (at least, in terms of marginal utility, if not money) in agricultural economies, allowing children to go to school. Also, the greater income provided to these agricultural economies would allow them to develop their infrastructure, making schools and libraries more accessible and allowing the underprivilaged to more easily participate in the NIE.
You must log in to post a comment.